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The essays collected here seek to establish bridges between virtue epistemology and
philosophy of science (broadly construed, including the history of science, the use
or,p".İn" scientific results to construct naturalistic philosophical theories, formal
epistemology, modeting, theory choice, etc.). Since Ernest Sosa,s ground breaking
essay "ıhe iatt and the ğramid" (19s0) andLindaZagzebski's Virtues of The Mind
(ı996), epistemologists have become increasingly interested in üe normative
aspects of knowledge, justification, understanding and other epistemic states_ Virtue
epİstemologists ground our evaluation of human cognition in a general commitment
to aretaic (or virtue theoretic), rather than deontologİcal or consequentİalİst norms.]
Two broad defining features of virtue epistemology are often understood through the
following principles: (a) knowledge and other important epistemic concepts
ur" 
"**"r,tiully 
normative and (b) epistemically valuable states of agents confer
epistemically valuable properties on their beliefs, not the other way around,2 Virtue
episte-oıoğy thus borrows liberally from the rich tradition in virtue ethics for a
range of noİmative fesources that have proven quite useful for epistemologists
interested in addressing traditional problems regarding epistemic luck and epistemic
value. while much more will be said about virtue epistemology below, and there
are indeed many species of virtue epistemology on offer in contemporary literature,
what unifies this movement can fruitfully be seen through the unique way virtue
lThis is not to suggest that overtly normative epistemology was not happening plior to sosa
and Zagzebski,s woİk, as Roderick Firth (1 978) and Roderick Chisholm had nicely articulated to
rule-coisequentialist structure of reliabilist theories and the deontological structure of internalist
theories respectively.
2The second commitment is typicaIly described as 'reversing the direction of analysis' for terms of
epistemic appraisal.
A. Fairweather (8)
Department of Phitosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, UsA
e-mail: afairweather@ gmail.com
Curiosity, Belief and Acquaintance
Ilhan Inan
Philosophers have paid little attention to curiosity until quite recently. There is now
at least a scarce literature that discusses how curİosİty relates to certaİn İntellectual
traits that we value such as inquisitiveness and open-mindedness, whether it is an
essential instrument to lead us to certain epistemİc achİevements such as the acqui-
şition of truth or knowledge, whether being curious is an intellectual, an ethical, or
even a moral virtue, and wheüer curiosity is required for a good life.ı Most of this
discussion takes place in an area where epistemology overlaps with ethics and
value theory, generally known as virtue epistemology. Whether curiosity is taken
to be a form ofvirtue or not, it should be clear that there are important connections
between being curious and some of ourbasic epistemic attitude§ and achievements.
Knowing, for instance, is an epistemic achievement, at lea§t in certain cases, and
curiosity is one of its basic motivators. The question of how curiosity and knowl-
edge are reiated brings about a host of interesting philosophical issues, the most
important of which relates to what curiosity is.2 After all üe classical "definiüon"
equate§ curiosity with a desire to know. There is then the important compıırative
logical question: If knowledge is a propositional attitude, is curiosity so too? There
are also issues conceming how curiosity relates not to knowledge, but rather its
lSee Daston and Park (20Ol), Baumgarten (200l), Kvanvig (2003), Miscevic (2ü7} Schmitt and
Lahroodi (2008), Brady (2009), Subasi (2009), Yigit (20l l). Apart from this lit€rature there has
been very little discussion on some oflhe basic philosophical questions conctrning curiosİty, such
as what curiosity is, what make§ it possible, how it is satisfied etc. See Kvanvig (2003) and espe-
cially Whircomb (2010). Though not directly on curiosity there is also some current relevant
research on open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, love of truth and related issues: see Zagzebski
(l96), Hookway (2003), Battaly (2008), Robert§ and Wood (2009), Riggs (20t0), Crisp (20l0),
Baehr (20l 1).
2I am inclined to think that curiosity based knowledge has more value than what might be cal|ed
"accidental" knowledge. If so this should provide good reason for virtue epistemologists to address
philosophical questions on curiosity.
I. Inan (a)
Department of Philosophy, Bogazici University, Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail : inanilha@boun.edu.tr
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opposite, namely ignorance. what are the mental mechanisms we employ which
allow us to become aware of our ignorance on a particular issue, and how does this
motivate curiosity? Is awareness of ignorance a precondition for curiosity? There
are also related issues that concern how curiosity re]ates to the asking of a question.
lf all knowing is in fact knowing the answer to a question, does it then follow that
knowledge always originates from curiosity?3 How does our curiosity relate to the
asking of a question, and how does the satisfaction of our curiosity relate to the
answering of our question? How does curiosity motivate inquiry into the unknown?
I have dealt with these and other related issues in detail in recent work.a Based on
some of the ideas developed there, I now wish to elaborate on topics which should
be relevant not just to virtue epistemology, but to epistemology in general, and
especially to formal epistemology. These invo]ve how curiosity relates to some of
our basic epistemic attitudes that come short of knowledge. Among them two stand
out as being the most relevant, that is belief and acquaintance. How does curiosity
relate to the holding of a belief that is uncertain and how does it relate to having
partial acquaintante with an object?
plenty of work has been done on belief, very little work has been done on
curiosity, and to my knowledge there is no work, at least in the philosophy literature,
that explicitly addresses the issue of how the two are related. To start off we may say
that if you have a belief that is too firm, then there will be no room left for curiosity.
If you are certain that plato was a philosopher for instance, then you cannot be
curious whether that really was or was not the case. curiosity about whether a
proposition is true or false can only take place under uncertainty. Here the notion of
certainty should be taken in the "subjective" sense. It has to do with the epistemic
attitude the subject takes with respect to the truth of a proposition. Being certain, in
this sense, corresponds to maximum strengü of a belief. once that level is reached
genuine curiosity becomes impossible. This is not a normative notion, rather it
describes the mental state one is in. Being subjectively certain is not a factive mental
state; that is a person may be subjectively certain that a given proposition is true,
when in fact that proposition is false. If an ancient was certain that the world is flat,
then he cou]d not have been curious about whether this was or was not in fact the
case. people who are çertain of their beliefs may not always have the right to be
certain. The evidence they have may not entitle them to be certain, but üey still
may. That is why people who dogmatically hold beliefs cannot bring themselves to
be curious about their beliefs without giving up üeir dogmatism. Fortunately, not
everyone is like this. There are many rational open-minded people who hold beliefs
without feeling certain that those be]iefs are true. The stronger your beliefgets the
less possible it becomes to be curious. So it does appear that curiosity is inversely
propositional to the strength of one's belief, or what in the Formal Epistemology
literature is called "degree of belief'.s This is a particularly interesting notion that
3 Schaffer (2007) explicitly defends the view that knowing is always knowing the answer to a ques-
tion; some ofCollingwood's (l940) ideas seem to imply it. I argue against this view in Inan (20l 2);
see especially p.l47.
aSee Inan (20'l2).
5For recent work on degrees of belief see Huber and SchmidlPetri (2009).
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connects epistemology with oüer branches of philosophy, as well other scientific
disciplines. That is because the degree of our belief in the truth of a proposition
partially determines how we are inclined to act, as well as how we ought act in a
given context. It is a central notion concerning the norms ofrationality, and it is an
essential concept to be utİlized in our attempts to explain and model üe human
mind. Now just like beliei curiosity also comes in degrees. The degree of one's
curİosİty İs one of the parameters that determines the strength of one's motİvatİon to
leam something new. It is an instance of one of üe "passions of üe soul",6 as
Descartes called it, which motivates inquiry. Understanding the epistemic features
of the human mind, both descriptively and normatively should then require us to
take into consideration curiosity. Once we integrate the notion of curiosity into the
formal epİstemology literature we will have a better chance of understanding and İn
effect mode]ing the human mind.
We enjoy curiosity partially because we are fallible beings. The evidence we
have for most of our beliefs about the external world, and perhaps even for some of
our beliefs about our own minds, do not guarantee that those beliefs are true. Merely
the fact that we are fallible beings however is not sufficient to explain our curiosity.
Curiosity can only take place when we come to rea|ize the fallibility of our beliefs.
It requires open-mindedness. And this can only take place in the absence of certainty.
That is why utterances in the form "I am certain that p, but I am still curious whether
p" can never express truths. Anything short of subjective certainty should then allow
some room for curiosity. Even if you know that it is extremely improbable that a
belief you hold might turn out to be false, you may still be curious about it. If you
have a lottery ticket which you know that its chances of winning üe big prize is
extremely slim, you may still be curious as to whether it will. In fact people who buy
lottery tickets find the motivation to check the winning numbers which indicates
that they are in fact curious as to whether theİr tİcket won. The more İnterestİng fact
is that you may be curious whether your ticket will win even if you believe that it
will not. That is, utterances in üe form "I believe that p, but I am curious whether
p" are fine, and in fact express truths in certain contexts. Curİosİty, at least İn one of
its forms, has to do wiü how much evidence one has for the truü of a proposition,
and whether one takes that evidence as being conclusive: the less evidence there is,
the more room for curiosity, Curiosity would then seem to have the potential of
being maximized when there is no evidence on either side. I have access to no
evidence foİ or against the truth of the proposition that there is intelligent life on
other planets. I neither believe nor disbelieve it, and, of course, I am extremely
curious about it. It would seem then that such cases of suspension of belief are ones
which have üe potential to maximize the degree of one's curiosity. So'then, it
initially appears as if the stronger one's belief gets the weaker the curiosity will
become. Going back to the lottery case, suppose you pay one dollar for a lottery
6There are six primitive passions of the soul according to Descartes (l989). Among üem is won-
der ("admiration" in the originat French) which is a "sudden surprise of Üe soul". Curiosity on the
oüer hand is only a sub-species of another primitive passion, namely desire, and it is explicitly
defined as "desire to understand" by Descartes.
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ticket and will collect one million dollars if you win where your chances of winning
is one in a million. Now you may be curious as to whether you will win, though the
strength of your curiosity under normal circumstances wou]d not be too high. That
is because the degree of your belief that you will win is close to zeto. But if you
played anoüer game which had the same stakes, but very different odds things
would appear to be different. Suppose you again bet one dollar, and then we flip a
fair coin, and if it is heads you win a million dollars and if it is tails you win nothing.
All else being equal, my hypothesis is that you would be a lot more curious as to
whether you will win in this case compared to the lottery case. That is because, all
else being equal, your degree of belief in the same proposition is now raised to
the "medium" value, mostly represented as 0.5 in the [0, 1] interval, If we raised the
odds so that this time the chances of you not winning is one in a million, the degree
of your curiosity will go down once again, all else being equal. This appears to show
that the degree of curiosity is inversely proportional to the degree of belief. Now
some may object to this by pointing out that at times as the degree of belief goes
higher so does one's curiosity. Suppose that after investigating the crime scene,
Holmes becomes curious who the murderer is. Initially there are no suspects, but
then Holmes finds good evidence that a certain Ralph, whom he knows from an
earlier case, might be the murderer. He may in fact come to believe, but not know
that Ralph is the ınurderer. Initially Ralph was not on Holmes' suspects list, there
was no evidence to tie him with the murder. We may assume that at üis stage the
degree of Holmes' belief in the proposition that Ratph is the murderer was 0.5.
Noneüeless Holmes may not have been curious whether Ralph is the murderer. But
then soon as he collects new evidence that makes Ralph a suspect, Holmes'degree
of belief of the proposition that Ralph is the murderer now has come to be quite
high. So the degree ofbeliefhas increased significantly, but contrary to what I said
earlier, we may easily imagine that Holmes has now become curious whether Ralph
is in fact üe murderer. So then it might seem in this case that the degree of one's
curiosity increases with the increase in the degree of belief. And then this will go on
until the peak is reaçhed, that is until the subject feels certain that he now knows üe
proposition in question or its negation. So under this account, Holmes' degree of
curiosity wi]l increase as he gathers more evidence that Ralph is the murderer; and
once he comes to know that Ralph is or is not the murderer, then he will no longer
be curious and the degree of his curiosity will suddenly drop to 0. This I believe is
not fully accurate. When there was no evidence for or against the claim that Ralph
is üe murderer Holrnes was not curious whether he was the one. Holmes became
curious soon as he found some evidence which made Ralph a suspect. The earlier
claim was that the degree of curiosity decreases as the degree of belief inçreases, all
else being equal. What is important to note is that in Holmes' case not all else is
equal. That is because at times new evidence may also increase oğr interesı.
Curiosity is not merely related to our degree of belief, there is anoüer important
parameter involved, namely our interest in the object of our curiosity. Initially
Holmes wa§ not interested in Ralph, or to be more precise he was not interested in
the truth of the proposition that Ralph is the murderer. After collecting evidence
making Ralph a suspect, Holmes then became interested. The issue of how interest
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and belief relate to one another is a tough one, but at lea§t how interest re]ates to
curiosity should be quite clear: the degree of curiosity is directly proportional to üe
degree ofinterest.
As I said anything short of complete certainty allows for curiosity.7 This of
course does not imply that we are curious about the truth ofjust any old proposition
we entertain in our minds of which we are not certain. The proposition üat the
number of words in the finished version of this article will be odd is not one that I
have any evidençe for or against. I am not even §ure whether it has a determinate
truth value. My degree of belief is 0.5, meaning that it i§ not even a belief that I
hold. And not only do I not hold a belief one way or anothe1 I am simply not inter-
ested in the issue. It makes no difference for me, or anyone else for that matter,
whether the number of words turns out to be even or odd in this article. If the
editors of this issue had developed a weird policy of publishing only üose articles
containing odd number of words, I might have had an interest in the topic. As it
stands I don't. There are also many beliefs we in fact do hold, in which we again
have no interest. After hearing the weather forecast, sayjust by accident, suppose
you come to believe that it will rain today; yet you may not be curious whether it
will or it wil] not rain today. You may simply not be interested in the topic. Lack of
certainty only when accompanied with interest motivates curiosity. This is why
you may hold two separate beliefs having the same degree, though you may be
curious about the truth of one, and not the other, or you may be curious about both,
but with different degrees. For instance, normally one's curiosity about something
as trivial as the solution to a logic puzzle will not be as strong as one's curiosity
about something as vital as the resu]t of a critical medical exam. That is because
under normal cirçumstances we care about our health more than we care about üe
so]ution to a puzz|e and therefore we have more interest in the former. The degree
of one's curiosity is fundamentally linked with one's interests in general, and, as
said earlier, it is directly proportional to the degree of interest in the truth of üe
proposition one is curious about. Just like beliefand curiosity, interest also comes
in degrees;the higher it gets üe more room there is for curiosity. Overall we might
then conclude that for any subject and a proposition that that subject grasps, the
degree of curiosity in the truth of that proposition will be inversely proportional to
the degree of belief in the truth of that proposition, but it will be directly propor-
tional to the degree of interest in the truth of that proposition. That of course does
not tell us how exactly these three parameters relate to one another, but İt at least
tells us that these are the parameters to consİder. If İnterest and belİef were İnde-
pendent attitudes, then there would have been a simple equation that connectş them
with curiosity. However they are not İndependent attitudes. In fact interest interacts
7I hold that one can even be curious about something he or she knows, as long as that piece of
knowledge is fallible and thus not certain in the subjective sense, Though an utterance such as "I
know that the world population is greater than seven bi]lion, but I am not certain that this is the case
and I am still curious whether it is so" does seem somewhat odd, it may very well express a truth.
Given that this would appear to be a controversial issue, I do not pursue it here since my cuıTent
focus is merely on how curiosity relates to belief.
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with belief in its own pecu}iar way, and without further inquiry into this interaction
we should not jump to any conclusion. It would for instance be wrong to conclude
that the degree of İnterest in the truth of a proposition is directly propoltİonal to the
degree of belief in the truth of that proposition. One may lack interest in the truth
of a proposition regardless of whether he or she has any evidence for it_ Whether
üe number of words in this article is odd is an issue I have no interest in, and üat
is total]y independent of my degree of belief in the truth of this proposition.
Therefore we should conclude that the reason why Holmes becomes more inter-
ested in whether Ralph is üe murderer soon as he collects new evidence making
him a suspect, cannot be merely due to the increase of his degree of belief. We
should have to bring into consideration Holmes' interest in who the murderer is in
order to explain the increase of his interest in whether Ralph is the murderer when
he gathers new evidence making him a suspect. The most that can be said here is
that the degree of one's curiosity is a function of his degree of belief and his degree
of interest when there is a full proposition involved.
The preceding discussion is applicable only to curiosity which has propositional
content. That is not always the case. To see this, we should distinguish between two
types of curiosity. If you are curiou§ about whether üere is life on other planets,
your curiosity has propositional content: you wish to know the truth value of the
proposition that there is life on other planets.8 But if you are curious about what
Plato's father's name was, then there is no proposition you can single out as one
whose truth value you are seeking. Or when Holmes is curious who the murderer is
when he has no suspects, there is no particular proposition in the form [a is the mur_
derer] of which Holmes is curious to know. So my hypothesis is that being curious
who someone is, or being curious when or where or how or why some event took
place need not involve curiosity in the truth of a proposition. Though this distinction
between two types of curiosity is far from being commonplace in philosophy or any
other discipline, the coffesponding distinction between two types of questions was
made more than a couple of millennia ago. Aristotle famously distinguished between
"whether-questions" that ask for whether there is a "middle term" and l'what-
questions" that ask for what that middle term is.9 Today many distinguish between
direct and indirect questions, where the former admit of "yes" or "no" as answers,
but üe latter, which are also known as "wh-questions", do not.l0 If we assume that
the use of interrogative sentences is our normal linguistic tool by which we express
ouf curiosity, then we should expect that there are two types of curiosity as well. I
will call curiosity expressible by a direct question "propositional curiosity", and
sThis is in fact an oversimplification. At times we wish to know more than just the truth value of
the proposition in question; we wish to know the fact that makes the proposition true. That is whY
I hold üat there are two ways of satisfying propositionaI curiosity, de re and de dicto. For a discus-
sion of this see Chapıer 2 Asking and Answering, and Chapter 9 Conditions for the Satisfaction of
Curiosity in Inan (20l2).
9Aristotle (1924), Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter l , p.5a.
IoIn contemporary philosophy the distinction was made by a number of philosophers. An early
version can be found in Leonard (l957).
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curiosity expressible by an indirect question "objectual curiosity". So even if we
gave a satisfactory account ofhow degree ofbeliefand propositiona] curiosity relate
to one other, that will not be sufficient. We will have to account for objectual
curiosity as well which cannot be reduced to a propositional attitude. This will
require us to introduce at least one new epistenic pafameter into our equation. The
moral to be drawn from all this is that our epistemic attitudes which motivate us to
act are not merely limited to the strengüs of our beliefs and interests. 
'We are
intellectually a bit more complicated than that.
so I take it that propositional curiosity is what is expressible by a question in üe
form "is it the case that s?" where s is a full declarative sentence that expresses a
proposition. If we further assume that truth and falsity are properties of propositions,
then the object of propositional curiosity will be an unknown truth value. If we put
this in terms of a desire to know, then we may say that in such cases the curious
subject desires to know which of the two truth vales a proposition has. In this sense
we may take this form of curiosity as a propositional attitude of a peculiar kind. This
is not the case though for objectual curiosity, i.e. curiosity that is expressible by a
wh-question. ln such cases it is not that the degree of belief togeüer with the degree
of interest are not sufficient to account for curiosity. Rather in these cases Üe notion
of degree ofbeliefis no longer applicable. That is because objectual curio§ity is not
propositional. In other words being objectually çurious is not a propositional
attitude. We çan no longer account for curiosity in terms of belief, given that there
is no such thing as "objectual" belief. The difference between the logical status of
belief and objectual curiosity reveals itself in surface grammar. Sentences in the
form "S is curious about the F"' are perfect constructions and are in fact used quite
frequently, but there is no analogous construction for belief. When Holmes asks
"who is the murderer of Smith?" out of curiosity, we may take that to mean that he
is curious about the murderer of smiü. so "Holmes is curious about the murderer
of Smith""expresses a truth, but "Holmes believes about the murderer of Smith" is
ungrammatical. (There is of course one specific use of the verb to believe in which
we say things like "Holmes believes John" and we might even say "Holmes believes
the murderer", but that is obviously not an objectual attitude.) When we say that
Holmes' curiosity is not propositional we do not wish to say merely that the
interrogative sentence that he uses does not contain a full proposition. The claim is
in fact a lot stronger than that. What we wish to say is that we cannot single out any
proposition of which Holmes wishes to know whether it is true or false. There
simply is no such proposition. Now some may perhaps wish to say that there is at
least a certain long disjunctive proposition in which each disjunct is a Possible
answer to the question. This long disjunction may be along the lines of "Ralph is the
murderer of Smith or Brown is the murderer of Smith or . ..". And then we may say
that Holmes wishes to know which disjunct is true. Now this might be true in certain
cases. If Holmes has, say, four possible suspects, and he knows that the murderer is
among them, üen he may have at his disposal a disjunction with four disjuncts. But
that is on the assumption that Holmes has certain §uspects to form the disjunction.
What if he is totally in the dark about the identity of the murderer? It might simply
be the case that the murderer is totally unknown to Holmes and neither his name nor
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any other information about him appears in any of Holmes' files. He has no actual
*rİp""tr, and not even possible ones, Nevertheless Holmes is curious who the
muİderer is. Regardless of whether Holmes has suspects or not, it is important to
notice here that being curious about who üe murderer is, is not üe same üing as
being curious about which disjunct is true in a disjunction. If we can formulate a
disjunction with all the possible an§wers to the question appearing as.Separate
disJuncts, then it should be clear that Holmes cannot grasp this very long proposition.
Oicourse Holmes knows very well what he is curious about; that is, being curious
is a mental state, and Holmes has access to it. So given Üat he cannot Single out a
certain proposition that he grasps as giving the content of his curiosity, we should
conclude that his curiosity does not have propositional content. It is of course true
that if Ralph is üe murderer and Holmes comes to know üis, then his curiosity will
be satisfied. But that does not imply at all üat Holmes was curious about whether
Ralph was the murderer. He may have never heard of Ralph before, and no
information may have been available to him about Ralph initially when he was
curious about the murderer. It is one thing to be curious about whether Ralph is the
murderer, it is another to be curious about who the murderer is; the former is
propositional the latter is not. I hold that these are very different mental states,
Objectual curiosity is not propositional nor can be reduced to it,
Now even ifyou are convinced that objectual curiosity is not propositional, you
may be inclined to üink that at least its satisfaction is propositional. If Holmes is
curious about the murderer, and Ralph is the one, then once Holmes comes to know
that Ralph is the murderer he should have satisfied his curiosity. That is not always
correct. That is because when Holmes comes to know that Ralph is the murderer, it
does not immediately foltow that he knows who the murderer is. Suppose that
Holmes receives an anonymou§ phone call from a man who claims to be the
murderer. Let us assume üat caller is in fact the murderer and he manages to
convince Holmes that this is the case by telling Holmes very specific detailed facts
about the murder. Let us further suppose that Holmes now has come to know that
üe caller is in fact the murderer. Even so Holmesstill knows very little about this
guy, in fact even if the cal]er tells him that his name is "Ralph" it might make no
diff"."n"". After all the name "Ralph" may be a made up name, and Holmes may
still wonder who this person is. Under this scenario it would not be wrong for
Holmes to assert that he does not know who üe murderer is.ll There is at least a
strict use of the notion of knowing who under which this is the case. He might come
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to know that Ralph is the murderer, and if he was asked who the murderer is he
could say "It is Ralph", but that does not change the fact that he does not know who
Ralph is; his degree of acquaintance with Ralph is not §ufficient. There have been
actual cases like this. One was üe famous Unabomber case. Before üe suspect was
caught, the police and the media had given the name "U4abomber" to the person
who was responsible for a number of mail bomb incidents. Even the name all by
itself aroused curiosity. People were curious about the Unabomber, given that üey
did not know who he was. Now go back to early 1990s when the Unabomber sent
one such mail to a university office. Initially the police may have been curious as to
whether the Unabomber struck again, and wheüer he or someone else ri/as respon-
sible. After investigating the evidence let us assume üat they found out that it was
the Unabomber again who was responsible for this latest incident. That may have
satisfied their curiosity whether the Unabomber was responsible for the latest
incident, but they still did not know who he was. They were §ti]l curious about this.
The satisfaction of objectual curiosity requires more than learning üat a certain
proposition is true. It requires raising the degree of your acquaintance with the
object of your curiosity to a certain level. What that level should be depends on
one's interests and many other contextual factors. Reaching a certain degree of
acquaintance of the object of curiosity may satisfy one but not §atisfy another, and
even the same person may change his standards from one context to another.l2 What
is important to note here is üat the police and the media and the interested public
were curious about who the Unabomber was given üat their degree of acquaintance
with this person was too low. All that they knew of him was what they were able to
gather from the evidence of the bombs he had sent. And given that there was a lot of
interest in the case, üere was a lot of curiosity.l3
So we may then wish to conclude that üere are two main pİırameters that deter_
mine the degree of one's (objectual) curiosity, namely the degree of interest and the
degree of acquaintance. That would not be fully accurate. If you are curious about the
colors of the Jamaican flag, that does not imply üat there are certain colors in this
flag of which you have a low degree of acquaintance. It is not that you wish to know
more about a certain coior and raise your degree of acquaintance with it. Rather
given that you are already acquainted with the basic colors, you wish to know which
ones appear in the Jamaican flag. In fact you may truthfully Say "I am acquainted
with üe colors of the Jamaican flag", and then you may add "but I do not know
which colors those are". If you have a particular interest in flags, then you may be
t2For a more detailed discussion ofthis see chapter l0 Relativity ofcuriosity and Its kıtisfaction
in Inan (20l2).
t3I am in full agreement here with Kvanvig (2003) in his emphasis on the need to appeal to an
objectual epistemic notion to explain our epistemic virtues. Kvanvig makes a further distinction
beİween uİderstanding aıd knowledge, and places objectual understanding at the top of the ePis-
temic values. For the present purposes all üat I am committing myseif is the view üat in order to
account for the satisfaction of curiosity we need to appeal to some epistemic notion that forms a
relation between an agent and an object. It seems to me that our common use of Üe verb to know
in the objectual sense caplures exactly this, though following Kvanvig we might prefer to rePlace
it with the noIion of understanding.
l5l
llIt is commonplace in philosophy to hold that knowing who is an interest relative term, l have
argued in my (zOı z) tnaİtııe reaİon for this is because in many contexts the notion of knowing who
is-used elliptically for a longer notion, though there is also what I called a "strict use" of this notion
that is non-elliptical and therefore not interest relative. Braun (2006) is perhaps the only one in the
literature \,/ho 
-also 
argues against the interest relativene§s of knowing who. However the epistemic
standards on Braun's view ofknowing who someone is, is so low that all it takes for one to know
who someone is to know a property of thut p"r.on which need not even be a uniquely identifying
one. obviously I disagree with Braun, for it appears that on his view we would not be able to
expıess genuine curioslty by asking a who-question. See my (20l2, pp. 6G5l) for a discussion of
Braun's position.
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curious about this even if you know that you are acquainted with the object of your
curiosity (which is a set of colors in üis case). Curiosity does not always imply lack
of acquaintance. As in this case, a curious subject may have a relatively high degree
of interest, but also a relatively high degree of acquaintance with the object of his
curiosity. If the degree of acquaintance is high, why should our subject be curious?
The short answer to this question is Üat curiosity has conceptual content. What you
lack in üis case is not acquaintance with certain colors, but rather you wish to know
whiçh of those colors (that you are already acquainted with) fall under the concept
the colors of the Jamaican flag.You are curious given üat you do not know which
colors üis term refers to. Acquaintance is an extensional notion, whereas what we
need is an intensional one, that is, we need a notion that is sensitive not only to the
degree of acquaintance of the object of curiosity, but also to what concept you repre-
sent üat object in your mind. I will call this parameter "the degree of ostensibility".
Roughly this notion applies to how the curious subject is epistemically related to an
object under a concept, To be çurious about an object we need to be able to concep-
tualize iu the basic tool by which we achieve üat is by constructing a definite descrip-
tion whose referent is unknown to us, what I have called an "ınostensible term"|a
relative to a subject, that is a term whose referent is unknown for that subject. The
referent may be unknown because the subject may simply not have come across it
before. Holmes may be curious about the murderer even when he has no suspects,
and when he has no epistemic tonnection to the murderer except for whatever evi-
dence there is at the murder scene. But we may also be curious about the referent
even when we do have some close epistemic connection to it, when the referent is in
fact an object we are partially acquainted with, and even when we know üat this is
the case. If Holmes has sufficient evidence to come to know that the murderer is one
of the two suspects boü of whom he knows to a certain degree, he may still be curi-
ous as to which of them is in fact the murderer. Satisfaction of curiosity takes place
only when we come to know that a certain object is the referent of our inostensible
term. For Holmes to satisfy his curiosity, he must be able to connect his inostensible
term "the murderer" with one of the two suspects and come to know this. If Ralph is
the murderer, Holmes must come to know Ralph as being üe murderer, where
"Ralph" is an ostensible term for Holmes in that he knows üat this name refers to a
person wit}ı whom he has some high degree of acquaintance. We may now say that
the degree of ostensibility of a term d for a subject ^§ reaches its maximum level if
üere is an object o such üat S is completely acquainted with o and,S knows that cı is
üe referent of d. The degree of ostensibility will be very low if there is no object üat
S is acquainted with which S knows to be the referent of d. And then üere will be
intermediate cases in which there is an object o with which S has a certain intermediate
degree of acquaintance.
The degree of curiosity then is a function of two factors: degree of interest and
degree of ostensibility. It is directly propoıtional to the former and inversely propor-
tional to the latter. Acquaintance is by itself not one of the direct parameters that
laSee Inan (2010,2012) for a detailed discussion of the distinction between ostensible
inostensible terms.
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determines curİosity and İts degree. Note that acquaintance İs an epİstemİc relatİon
between an object and a subject; it is a purely extensional relation - rather than an
intensional one. That is because the acquaintance relation says nothing about how
the subject conceptualizes the object in question. Presumably üis is not true for
propositional knowledge orbelief. When you §ay Sue knows üat üe world is round,
you do say something about how she conceptualizes a certain fact. Bu when you say
that Sue is acquainted with Ben, you say nothing about how Sue conceptualizes
Ben. Now it might be the case that acquaintance a|ways requires a form of concep-
tualization, i.e. in order for Sue to be acquainted with Ben she must have some kind
of mental representation of Ben which has conceptual content. Or one might follow
Russell here and hold that there is direct acquaintance with some kinds of entities
that is preJinguistic having no conceptual content. Either way it is a fact üat an
acquaintance attribution in üe form [S is acquainted with o] says nothing about how
the subject conceptualizes the object. This is exactly why acquaintance together
with interest are not sufficient to explain curiosity. I claim that curiosity always
requires the representation of an unknown object. That kind of representation for us
has conceptual content. If üere are other forms of representation that we, or §ome
animals, or some extra-terrestrial beings employ, then there are oüer forms of curi-
osity that do not have conceptual content. Still the curious being must be able to
represent something unknown; without it Üere is no curiosity. That is why some
animals or infants who exhibit novelty seeking behavior, and try to explore their
environment are not necessarily curious beings on my account. Wandering is not
wondering. To wonder, in the sense of being curious, one must have the ability to
attempt to single out something unknown and seek it. This requires a higher order
mental capability than simply having the instinct or drive to be attracted to novel
things in the environment. So even if one may make a tase t}ıat there can be curİos-
ity with no conceptual content, üere cannot be curiosity without the ability to rep-
resent the unknown. This kind of representation is what I take to be a form of
purported reference, (which I call "inostensible reference".) Every curious being
attempts to refer to an unknown; if there in fact is such a thing, üen reference may
succeed, if there is no such thing then it fails. Either way there is an attempt to refer
to the object ofcuriosity. It is in this §ense that curiosity is an intentional as well as
intensional mental state. It is intentiona] in the sense that it is directed towards an
object (though it may turn out üat there is no such object), and it is intensional in
the sense that it has representatİonal content. That representatİonal content when
expressed in language is captured by an interrogative sentence. Given that sentences
have conceptual content, it follows that human curiosity expressible in language has
conceptual content. This is exactly why we cannot account for objectual curiosity
by appealing to the notion of acquaintance alone. Acquaintance is an extensional
notion, but what is needed is an intensional notion such as ostensibility. Objectual
curiosity requires one to grasp a concept which determines the object of one's curi-
osity. The degree of curiosity is then a function of the degree of ostensibility of that
concept. The notion of acquaintance is sti]l relevant, but in an indirect way. We may
def,ne the ostensibility of a concept for a subject in terms of the degree of acquain-
tance of the object (determined by that concept) under that concept.
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This account takes acquaintance as admitting ofdegrees. That was not the case
for Russell who took "acquaintance" to be an absolute notion, an all or nothing
affair. Russell did however distinguish between different stages of "removal from
acquaintance":
It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from acquaintance with particu-
lars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him, Bismarck to those who only know of him
through history, the man with the iron mask, the longestJived of men. These are progres-
sively further removed from acquaintance with particulars. ..r5
Once we lower Russell's standards of acquaintance, then it should fo]low that what
he calls "the stages of removal from acquaintance" can simply be captured by üe
notion of "the degrees of acquaintance". Note that on Russel]'s account all these
examples in the quote above are cases of what Russell called "knowledge of üings".
There were two forms of it; knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
descrİptİon: Bİsmarck knows hİmself by acquaintance, and we know Bİsmarck by
description. In the terminology adopted here this would imply that Bismark's degree
of acquaintance was maximum (say 1), but since our knowledge of him is indirect
and mostly based on testimony of others our degree of acquaintance whatever it is,
is less than l. For a good historian who specializes in that period that degree may be
quite high, for oüers it may be lower. The lower it gets the more room there will
be for curiosity. If all I know about Bismarck is üat he was a famous historical
figure, I might then be curious about him. I could express this in a question form:
Who is Bismarck? Now üe problem with this c]assical piece by Russell is that it
says a lot about knowledge but nothing about ignorance and obviously nothing
about curiosity. There is, I believe, an intuitive cut offpoint between the four stages
of removal from acquaintance that Russell talks about. Bismarck had knowledge of
himself by acquaintance and we know him through history, but what about the man
with the iron mask, and especially the longest-lived of men? These are supposed to
be two cases of knowledge by description on Russell's account. It seems clear to me
that they aren't. I do not know the longest lived of men. It is simply wrong to
attrİbute to me knowledge of him. The degree of ostensibility reaches a very low
level in such cases. That is why we easily become curious. That is I do not know of
any individual as being üe longest lived of men, which is exactly what makes the
definite description "the longest lived of men" inostensible. If I have an interest in
üe topic, I could become curious about who in fact was the man with the iron mask
or the longest lived of men. It will be more difficult to bring yourself to be curious
about who Bismarck is, if you know a lot about him. The more you know the more
difficult it will become. Just like a degree of belief that is short of complete certainty
will allow for curiosity, a degree of ostensibility that is short of full acquaintance
under a concept will leave some room for curiosity.16
15Russel] (l9l0), p. 1 l6.
|6Fora more detailed discussion ofthis see CDapıer 3, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge
by Description, in Inan (20l2).
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Finally let me note that in dealİng with propositional curiosity the central notion
that I have appealed to, namely, degree of belief can perhaps be cashed out in terms
of the notion of degree of ostensibilify. If one takes the object of propositional
curiosity to be an unknown truÜ value, üen we may tran§late every such case into
an inostensible definİte description that refers to one of üe two truth values (or to
some other value if one subscribes to many-valued system of logic.) If you are
curious about wheüer üere is ]ife on other planets, then, under this account, what
you wish to know is the referent of the definite description "üe truü value of the
proposition that there is life on other planets". This is the inostensible term that
gives rise to your curiosity. If your degree of belief regarding this proposition is 0.5,
then the degree of ostensibility of the definite description will be at its minimum,
namely 0. And if you have a degree of belief that is higher, then the degree of
ostensibility of the definite description "the truth value of the proposition üat ..."
will also be higher. If so, then degree of belief will simply be a special case of
degree of ostensibility. The degree of ostensibi]ity of a whole declarative §entence
is also a function of the degree of ostensibility of its constituent terms. Consider a
simple sentence in the subject/predicate form, and suppose S knows with complete
certainty the proposition expressed by it. In this case the degree of belief for S is 1.
Now normally that would imply that the degree of ostensibility is also 1 for S. That
however is not always the case. The degree of ostensibility of a sentence is a func-
tion of not only the degree of belief, but also the degrees of ostensibility of the
constituent parts of the sentence. I know wİü complete certainty that the 12ü
perfect number is not a prime. That is because I know that no perfect number is a
prime, not because I have calculated the 12th perfect number and discovered üat it
was not a prime. Though my degree of belief is 1, my degree of ostensibility is
significantly lower. It cannot be higher than the degree ofostensibility ofthe subject
term "üe 12th perfect number", which is quite low because I do not know what
number it refers to. Al1 I can claim to know about this number is what I can imme-
diately deduce from the description together with my background knowledge of
perfect numbers. The degree of ostensibility also applies to the predicate term
within that sentence. Now given that I know what a perfect number is, and that I
know a few examples, my degree of ostensibility is quite high. That might not
always be the case. There can be a predicate term that one grasps without knowing
what property is denoted by it. If I ask you what color your lover's eyes are, and you
answer by saying that üey are your favorite color, I will have learnt something new,
but I still may not know what color your lover's eyes are if I don't know your favor-
ite color. So if you utter the sentence "my lover's eyes are my favorite color", the
degree of ostensibility of the subject term would be reasonably high for me assum-
ing that I know your lover to some extent, but the degree of ostensibility of the
predicate term would be quite low for me given that I do not know your favorite
color. We may also imagine that I have no clue as to who your lover is, and know
noüing about her except that she is your lover and whatever else I can deduce from
that. In such a case my degree of ostensibility of the subject term will also be very
low. So it is possible to know that a proposition about a person is true even when you
do not know who is being talked about and what is being said about her. Ofcourse
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I know that üe proposition is about your lover, and if §ome third party were to ask
me who you are talking about I could truthfully say "he is talking about his lover",
but that does not change the fact that I do not know who your lover İs, İfwe give the
term "knowing who" what I have called its strict use.l7 The degrees of ostensibility
for both the subject as well as the predicate terın may be close to 0, and yet I may
still know üat the proposition is true. If I take your word for it, then I may come to
know that your lover's eyes are your favorite color. My degree of belief might be
very high, close to 1, but my degree of ostensibility is nonetheless very low. That is
why I hold that üere are two ways to satisfy propositional curiosity, de re and de
dicto.t8 Merely coming to know that the proposition is true will give you de dicto
satisfaction. You will come to know that there is a fact that makes the proposition
true, but you are still in üe dark as to what constituents that fact has. You know üat
a certain person has a certain property, but you neither know who that person is, nor
what property is being predicated of her. That is why the degree of ostensibility of
the whole sentence is very low. In order to satisfy your curiosity de re you need to
raise it, and to do that you have to come to know that person and üe property attrib-
uted to her. This will put you in touch with that fact. Merely de dicto satisfaction
gives you what I have called inostensible knowledge, whereas de re satisfaction
gives you ostensible knowledge. Propositional knowledge and beliefattributions are
not fine grained enough to distinguish between these two cases.
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